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Terrorism as a backfire process 
Abstract 
Terrorism is widely seen as an injustice, naturally enough because it is a blatant violation of human rights. 
The reaction against actions that are perceived as unjust can be called 'backfire'. The concept of backfire 
is an extension of Gene Sharp's political jiujitsu concept. The strange thing about terrorism is that it 
seems designed to backfire. Look in turn at each of the five methods of inhibiting backfire. First is cover-
up. Terrorists commonly carry out their actions publicly and announce responsibility for them. They 
expose their actions rather than covering them up. Second is devaluing the target. Usually terrorists have 
lower status than their targets, especially when prominent citizens are targeted. The potential for 
devaluing the targets of terrorism is not great. Third is reinterpreting the action. Terrorists seldom say that 
there was not really a bombing or that the number of dead is exaggerated or that the attack was a 
mistake. Fourth is using official processes to give the appearance of justice. Terrorists usually have no 
access to courts, commissions of inquiry or other official processes for justifying their actions. Fifth is 
intimidation and bribery. Terrorists can threaten those who criticize them, especially those in their own 
milieu. But their ability to bribe targets and witnesses is limited. In summary, terrorists have limited 
capacity to inhibit outrage about their actions. Indeed, they often go out of their way to magnify the sense 
of outrage, for example by seeking media coverage. Therefore it is predictable that most terrorist actions 
backfire against the terrorists. This analysis applies only to non-state terrorists, the ones that receive the 
bulk of attention by governments and the media. The question remains why non-state terrorists often 
behave in a way that is almost guaranteed to backfire. This chapter will analyze both state and non-state 
terrorism using backfire analysis and spelling out implications for nonviolent resistance to and prevention 
of terrorism. 
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Terrorism as predictable backfire 
 
On the face of it, terrorism seems to be an in-
credibly counterproductive method of action.1 
When violent attacks are made against inno-
cent civilians, the usual response is revulsion 
and increased popular support for government 
action against the terrorists and those associ-
ated with them. In short, terrorism is almost 
guaranteed to backfire. This suggests the 
motivation for terrorism may often be some-
thing other than effectiveness.  
 The terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 
were a challenge to U.S. corporate and 
military power but, rather than weakening the 
United States, instead had the effect of gener-
ating enormous sympathy around the world for 
the U.S. people and mobilizing U.S. public 
opinion in favour of attacks on anyone held 
responsible. The 9/11 attacks legitimized the 
unleashing of U.S. military power in ways 
previously only contemplated — including 
attacks on groups not responsible for 9/11. 
 The same pattern can be observed time and 
again in other terrorist incidents. Every 
Palestinian suicide bombing gives greater 
legitimacy to harsh policies by the Israeli 
government. The spectacular attacks by Che-
chen rebels against the Russian people have 
led to greater support for brutal methods used 
by the Russian government in Chechnya. 
 This pattern has prevailed for a long time. 
Uruguay used to be a model liberal democ-
racy, known as the Switzerland of South 
America. In the 1960s, as the economy stag-
nated and corruption worsened, the govern-
ment was challenged by the Tupamaros, a left-
wing revolutionary movement. The Tupama-
                                         
1. Caleb Carr, The Lessons of Terror (New 
York: Random House, 2002), argues that all 
forms of violence against civilians have been 
counterproductive throughout history. 
ros gradually escalated their tactics, eventually 
engaging in urban terrorism including kidnap-
pings, bombings, and assassinations. The 
government used the Tupamaro attacks as a 
pretext for heavy-handed repression, including 
police searches, arrests, and torture. The 
actions of the Tupamaros, rather than leading 
to revolution, resulted in 1973 in the destruc-
tion of democracy and descent into repressive 
military rule.2 
 In some cases, terrorism seems to be suc-
cessful in achieving gains for oppressed 
groups, as in Sri Lanka and Northern Ireland.3 
But in such struggles, there was widespread 
community support for the cause. The question 
is whether terrorism as a tactic helped or hin-
dered the cause. As discussed later, nonviolent 
tactics may be more effective in achieving 
goals with fewer casualties along the way. 
 Terrorism is widely seen as an injustice, 
because it is a blatant violation of human 
rights. What is both strange and striking about 
terrorism is that it flouts all the techniques 
usually used to dampen outrage over injustice 
— in other words, it seems designed to back-
fire. Terrorism is widely perceived as unjust 
and it is often intended to generate attention, 
thus satisfying the two fundamental conditions 
                                         
2. See, for example, Arturo C. Porzecanski, 
Uruguay’s Tupamaros: The Urban Guerrilla 
(New York: Praeger, 1973). After restoration 
of representative government in 1985, the 
Tupamaros became a political party. I owe this 
example to Andrew Mack. 
3. Robert A. Pape, Dying to Win: The Strate-
gic Logic of Suicide Terrorism (New York: 
Random House, 2005), argues that most 
suicide terrorism is part of campaigns with 
instrumental aims. However, he does not com-
pare terrorism, as a tactic, with alternatives. 
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for backfire. Indeed, terrorism has been called 
“communication activated and amplified by 
violence.”4  
 Terrorism illustrates a very different back-
fire dynamic than the cases described in 
previous chapters. In massacres, beatings, 
dismissals, wars, and torture, perpetrators 
normally do everything possible to reduce 
outrage from their actions. But with terrorism, 
all the usual rules are ignored. The whole point 
is to generate shock and horror. 
 Look in turn at each of the five methods of 
inhibiting outrage. First is covering up the 
event. Terrorists commonly carry out their 
actions publicly or announce responsibility for 
them or both. Sometimes they even claim 
responsibility for actions they didn’t carry out. 
They expose their actions rather than covering 
them up.  
 Second is devaluing the target. Usually 
terrorists have lower status than their targets, 
especially when prominent citizens are kid-
napped or assassinated. The potential for 
devaluing the targets of terrorism is not great. 
If al Qaeda has used derogatory labels for the 
victims of 9/11, these labels have no popular 
acceptance. 
 Third is reinterpreting the event. Terrorists 
seldom say there wasn’t really a bombing or 
the number of dead was small or the attack 
was a mistake. Indeed, they are more likely to 
celebrate and exaggerate their attacks.  
 Fourth is using official processes to give the 
appearance of justice. Terrorists usually have 
no access to courts, commissions of inquiry, 
panels of prestigious experts, or other official 
                                         
4. Alex P. Schmid and Janny de Graaf, 
Violence as Communication: Insurgent 
Terrorism and the Western News Media 
(London: Sage, 1982), 54. See also Brigitte L. 
Nacos, Mass-Mediated Terrorism: The 
Central Role of the Media in Terrorism and 
Counterterrorism (Lanham, MD: Rowman & 
Littlefield, 2002); Joseph S. Tuman, Commu-
nicating Terror: The Rhetorical Dimensions of 
Terrorism (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2003). 
processes for justifying their actions.5 Quite 
the contrary: these processes are regularly used 
against them, for example when alleged 
terrorists are brought to trial. 
 Fifth is intimidation and bribery. The power 
of terrorists to intimidate opponents and critics 
— politicians, military forces, intelligence 
agencies, journalists, ordinary citizens — is 
seldom very great, as evidenced by the number 
of citizens willing to publicly denunciate ter-
rorists and their attacks. After the March 2004 
Madrid train bombings, large numbers of 
Spaniards joined public protests against the 
bombings. On the other hand, terrorists are 
usually more able to intimidate those who 
criticize them from within their own milieu. 
Finally, their ability to bribe targets and wit-
nesses is limited.  
 In summary, terrorists have limited capacity 
to inhibit repugnance resulting from their 
actions. Indeed, they often go out of their way 
to magnify the sense of revulsion, for example 
by seeking media coverage. Therefore it is 
predictable that most terrorist actions backfire 
against the terrorists. 
 In the next section, I explore some possible 
reasons for the persistence of non-state terror-
ism despite its poor record of instrumental 
success. Then I use the same framework to 
examine terrorism by states, which have a 
much greater capacity to reduce disgust from 
their actions. Finally, I look at the implications 
for nonviolent responses to terrorism. 
 
Why Terrorism by the Weak? 
 
The question thus arises of why terrorists 
behave in a way almost guaranteed to be 
counterproductive. It is possible to identify 
several explanations. 
                                         
5. Al Qaeda leaders have sought opinions from 
Islamic scholars to justify their killing of 
civilians, but the purpose of this seems mainly 
for ideological support within the network. 
(Note that the search for theological justifica-
tion for killing is peculiar neither to terrorists 
nor to Islam.) 
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 First, terrorism can be an expressive act, 
rather than an instrumental one.6 It can be an 
expression of resistance against humiliation or 
degradation experienced, consciously or un-
consciously, or an expression of revenge 
against previous acts by the opponent. Expres-
sive acts can serve emotional purposes even 
when they are not effective in practical terms.7 
 Second, terrorism is a characteristically 
masculine act.8 Nearly all terrorists are male. 
The few female terrorists — such as some 
Palestinian suicide bombers — are unusual 
and often generate disproportionate attention. 
Even when women are involved, men are 
almost always the commanders, for example 
the organizers of suicide bombings. 
 Males are far more likely than females to be 
involved in all types of violence, not just 
terrorism. Violence is seen by some — such as 
Frantz Fanon, theorist of decolonization — as 
a psychologically liberating act.9 This psychol-
ogy is, in my view, largely masculine. 
 Third, some terrorists and observers believe 
violence is an effective way of achieving their 
goals. The belief in the potency of violence is 
pervasive in many cultures, for example un-
derlying news reports that concentrate on 
violence and ignore low-profile nonviolent 
action, in Hollywood movies where good guys 
                                         
6. Jessica Stern, Terror in the Name of God: 
Why Religious Militants Kill (New York: 
Ecco, 2004), 7, 282. 
7. Thomas J. Scheff, Bloody Revenge: 
Emotions, Nationalism, and War (Boulder, 
CO: Westview, 1994), highlights the role of 
unacknowledged shame in protracted conflict, 
especially war. 
8. Robin Morgan, The Demon Lover: On the 
Sexuality of Terrorism (New York: Norton, 
1989). 
9. Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, 
trans. Constance Farrington (New York: 
Grove Press, 1963), 94: “At the level of 
individuals, violence is a cleansing force. It 
frees the native from his inferiority complex 
and from his despair and inaction; it makes 
him fearless and restores his self-respect.” 
use violence more effectively than bad guys, 
and in history books that concentrate on wars 
and governments. So, despite the dismal 
record of terrorists in promoting their causes, 
many of them assume violence on behalf of 
their cause must be effective. 
 Fourth, terrorism can be used instrumen-
tally to provoke counter-violence from the 
state. If this counter-violence is seen as exces-
sive — as it sometimes is — then this can 
create more support for the cause espoused by 
the terrorists. In other words, although terror-
ism backfires, it can lead to state repression 
that itself backfires by generating greater 
support for the cause. This sort of process, 
spelled out in some writing on guerrilla 
warfare, can be seen in many encounters, for 
example in British military actions against 
IRA terrorists and in Israeli military actions 
against Palestinian terrorists. The military 
actions are sometimes so excessive that many 
civilians are humiliated, injured, or killed, 
leading to greater support for the anti-govern-
ment cause.10 After all, state terror is some-
times motivated by revenge rather than a 
calculated assessment of benefits and costs. 
 Thus, sometimes, non-state terrorism, by 
provoking an even greater state terror, has the 
result that more people oppose the govern-
ment. But a full assessment of terrorism in this 
scenario should look at its costs — lives, 
property damage, loss of civil liberties — as 
well as its benefits, and should also look at 
alternative routes to the same ends, as dis-
cussed later. 
 Fifth, terrorism can be part of a cycle of 
violence that cements the role of leaders at the 
expense of the success of the struggle. A 
viable struggle using conventional, legal, 
and/or nonviolent means can be derailed by a 
terrorist campaign that gives greater power to 
                                         
10. According to Alan Cullison, “Inside Al-
Qaeda’s Hard Drive,” Atlantic Monthly 294 
(September 2004), 55–70, internal communi-
cations of al Qaeda revealed that, “its aim was 
to tempt the powers to strike back in a way 
that would create sympathy for the terrorists” 
(58). 
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the terrorist leaders, most commonly when 
violence provokes counter-violence. For 
example, in Kosovo, there was a decade-long 
nonviolent struggle for independence. But 
after the Kosovo Liberation Army adopted 
terrorist tactics, leading to counter-violence by 
the Serbian rulers and then NATO interven-
tion, the KLA gained leadership of the inde-
pendence struggle.11 
 The other side of this dynamic is the value 
to some government leaders when opponents 
resort to violence. Every Palestinian suicide 
bombing cements the position and policies of 
Israeli leaders who take a punitive stance 
towards Palestinian aspirations. In this context, 
nonviolent struggle is a threat, which many 
people believe is why the Israeli government 
deported Palestinian nonviolence advocate 
Mubarak Awad.  
 Some governments — operating either in a 
calculating or an instinctive fashion — may 
provoke or fail to prevent terrorism by their 
opponents to both discredit the opponents and 
cement the government’s own position. This is 
a version of the process of using agents provo-
cateurs to instigate or provoke violence in 
protest movements in order to discredit them 
and justify the use of state force against them. 
More generally, conventional government 
anti-terrorism policies, by killing, subjugating, 
and humiliating members of oppressed groups, 
seem ideally designed to foster the terrorism 
they ostensibly seek to oppose. Violence on 
both sides serves to polarize the population, 
giving more power to leaders, whereas peace-
ful measures have a greater capacity to build 
bridges between erstwhile opponents. 
 There are thus many possible reasons for 
adopting terrorism, most of which have noth-
ing to do with being effective in bringing 




This analysis so far applies only to non-state 
terrorists, the ones receiving the bulk of 
                                         
11. Howard Clark, Civil Resistance in Kosovo 
(London: Pluto, 2000). 
attention by governments and the media. 
States that exercise terror, in contrast, have a 
much greater capacity to inhibit outrage: they 
routinely cover up their actions, for example 
by hiding the use of torture and by using death 
squads and proxy armies12; they smear their 
targets as criminals or terrorists; they say they 
are protecting borders, dealing with crime, or 
countering subversion, and claim that abuses 
are aberrations; they often establish legal 
processes for their actions to give the appear-
ance of justice; and they can intimidate or 
bribe those who might challenge or expose 
their actions. So it is not surprising that state 
terror, though it leads to vastly more deaths 
and suffering than non-state terror, seldom 
generates much public concern. 
 Consider for example the killings carried 
out by the military in Indonesia in 1965-
1966.13 The trigger for the launching of terror 
was an alleged Communist Party coup attempt 
against the left-wing Sukarno government, 
though this explanation has been disputed. In 
any case, the military action was justified as 
necessary to defend the country against a 
communist takeover. Western governments 
largely supported this interpretation, and raised 
little protest against the scale of killing. Those 
targeted were labeled communists — some, 
certainly, were members of the very large 
Communist Party, but many were not — and 
maligned as such. The killings thus constituted 
what Chomsky and Herman call “constructive 
terror,” namely for a “good cause” and against 
a suitably stigmatized enemy.14 
                                         
12. Bruce B. Campbell and Arthur D. Brenner, 
eds., Death Squads in Global Perspective: 
Murder with Deniability (New York: St. 
Martin’s Press, 2000). 
13. Robert Cribb, ed., The Indonesian Killings 
1965–1966 (Melbourne: Centre for Southeast 
Asian Studies, Monash University, 1990). 
14. Noam Chomsky and Edward S. Herman, 
The Political Economy of Human Rights, 
Volume 1: The Washington Connection and 
Third World Fascism (Montréal: Black Rose 
Books, 1979), 205–17. 
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 Although the slaughter was not secret, there 
was no systematic documentation of what 
happened. Considering the vast scale of killing 
— many hundreds of thousands of people died 
— the events received relatively little interna-
tional attention. This was a sort of de facto 
cover-up. Legal processes were not deployed 
against perpetrators of the slaughter, but 
instead used to impose lengthy prison sen-
tences on thousands of targets whose lives 
were spared. It is hard to obtain evidence of 
intimidation and bribery used to prevent 
opposition, but it is reasonable to presume 
Indonesians who protested against the killing 
would have themselves become targets, 
whereas those who cooperated might be 
rewarded. Of course killing is likely to intimi-
date those who observe or hear about it. 
 Another example of state terror is Stalin-
ism, in which many millions died in purges 
and prison camps and as a result of forced 
relocation and starvation. The scale of the 
terror was hidden by pervasive censorship and 
by disinformation, for example guiding 
visitors through carefully staged tours that 
gave the impression of a successful socialist 
state.15 The victims of Stalinism were vilified 
as reactionaries, members of the bourgeoisie, 
traitors, criminals, mentally ill, and enemies of 
the revolution. The whole process was 
portrayed as one of building a socialist society. 
Legal processes were established to give the 
appearance of justice; show trials, in which 
dissidents were induced to confess to anti-
Soviet crimes, were the visible face of false 
justice.16 Internal opponents of the terror could 
themselves become targets, whereas support-
                                         
15. Paul Hollander, Political Pilgrims: Travels 
of Western Intellectuals to the Soviet Union, 
China, and Cuba 1928–1978 (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1981). 
16. Show trials were public and thus went 
against the tendency to cover up terror. A 
possible interpretation is that, for the state, the 
benefit of formal legitimacy outweighed the 
benefits of secrecy. Of course, in the show 
trials the political motivation of the charges 
was covered up. 
ers stood to gain. Fellow travelers from other 
countries, who whitewashed the terror, could 
expect to be received favorably by the Stalinist 
regime. Thus, the Stalinist state was able to 
use, with good effect, every one of the five 
methods for reducing outrage from injustice. 
On the other hand, these methods had little 
effect on the most vocal opponents of Stalin-
ism, anticommunists in the West, who were 
unconvinced or unaffected by vilification of 
victims, by Stalinist justifications, by show 
trials, and by the potential for intimidation or 
bribery. 
 The success of states in minimizing public 
disgust and fury from their terrorist activities 
is revealed in the great discrepancy between 
the massive media coverage of non-state 
terrorism and the scant attention to state 
terrorism. Usually governments only condemn 
state terrorism when perpetrated by certain 
enemy states, as when the U.S. government 
applies the label “rogue state.” The research 
literature on terrorism follows the agenda set 
by governments and the mass media, concen-
trating on non-state terrorism, with relatively 
few treatments of state terrorism.17  
                                         
17. This observation is documented in Edna O. 
F. Reid, “Evolution of a Body of Knowledge: 
An Analysis of Terrorism Research,” Infor-
mation Processing and Management, 33 
(1997): 91–106. I thank Steve Wright for 
informing me of this reference. Treatments of 
state terrorism include Chomsky and Herman, 
Political Economy of Human Rights; Frederick 
H. Gareau, State Terrorism and the United 
States: From Counterinsurgency to the War on 
Terrorism (Atlanta, GA: Clarity Press, 2004); 
Alexander George, ed., Western State Terror-
ism (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991); Jeffrey 
Ian Ross, ed., Controlling State Crime, 2d ed. 
(New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 
2000); Jeffrey Ian Ross, ed., Varieties of State 
Crime and Its Control (Monsey, NY: Criminal 
Justice Press, 2000); Michael Stohl and 
George A. Lopez, eds., The State as Terrorist: 
The Dynamics of Governmental Violence and 
Repression (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1984); 
Michael Stohl and George A. Lopez, eds., 
Terrible Beyond Endurance? The Foreign 
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 Even the conventional definition of terror-
ism, as violence exercised by non-government 
groups against civilians for political ends, 
reflects the interests of states.18 A less one-
sided definition of terrorism, as violence 
against civilians used for political ends, would 
immediately identify states as the world’s 
leading terrorists, through torture, warfare, and 
the usual range of repressive tactics.19 The 
very words “terror,” “terrorism,” and “terror-
ist” thus are political labels, typically directed 
at opponents rather than used in a precise and 
consistent fashion.20 
 
Nonviolent Action as an Alternative to 
Terrorism 
 
Nonviolent action — including methods such 
as rallies, vigils, strikes, boycotts, and sit-ins 
— is usually far more effective than violence 
in generating support and bringing about 
desirable change. Consider for example a 
peaceful protest against government policies. 
If police beat or kill protesters, this can back-
fire against the government, as at Sharpeville, 
Dili, and Dharasana. Consider each of the five 
methods for inhibiting backfire. 
 
                                                                
Policy of State Terrorism (Westport, CT: 
Greenwood, 1988). 
18. This point is made emphatically by 
Edward S. Herman, The Real Terror Network: 
Terrorism in Fact and Propaganda (Boston: 
South End Press, 1982). 
19. Eric Markusen and David Kopf, The 
Holocaust and Strategic Bombing: Genocide 
and Total War in the Twentieth Century 
(Boulder, CO: Westview, 1995), point to 
similarities between genocide and strategic 
bombing. Similar parallels exist between 
terrorism and warfare. 
20. Conor Geerty, The Future of Terrorism 
(London: Phoenix, 1997), gives a cogent 
critique of the content of the term “terrorism” 
as evolving from its origins as state terror to an 
incoherent expression of condemnation. 
 • Many nonviolent actions are carried out in 
public, so covering up attacks is not easy. 
 • When protesters dress conventionally and 
behave moderately and respectfully — rather 
than dressing unconventionally and behaving 
aggressively — then it is difficult for the 
government to devalue them. 
 • When protesters explicitly commit them-
selves to nonviolence and are open about their 
goals and methods, it is more difficult for 
governments to be convincing with alternative 
interpretations. 
 • If, when activists come under attack, they 
appeal directly to the public — including 
allies, opponents, and third parties — they are 
more likely to obtain support than by relying 
on official channels such as making com-
plaints about police misconduct. 
 • Nonviolent action is itself a stand in the 
face of potential intimidation. 
 
Contrasting each of these with the corre-
sponding method when violence is used, it is 
apparent that nonviolent action is far more 
likely to build support.  
 One of the keys to backfire is that people 
perceive violent attacks on peaceful protesters, 
or against uninvolved civilians, as unjust. This 
is the reason nonviolence proponents continu-
ally stress the importance of maintaining 
nonviolent discipline.21 A breakdown in disci-
pline — even a brief scuffle or some verbal 
abuse — changes the nature of the interaction 
and alters the perception of injustice when 
police use violence. In contrast, bombings and 
assassinations completely undercut this 
dynamic. 
 Nonviolent action has a good track record 
in liberation struggles.22 The Palestinian 
                                         
21. Gene Sharp, The Politics of Nonviolent 
Action (Boston: Porter Sargent, 1973), 573–
655, includes “solidarity and discipline to fight 
repression” as one of the stages in his 
“dynamics of nonviolent action,” just before 
political jiu-jitsu. 
22. Adrian Karatnycky and Peter Ackerman, 
How Freedom is Won: From Civic Struggle to 
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Liberation Organization used terrorism for 
years but with limited success. The spontane-
ous development of the first intifada in 1987 
— an unarmed struggle rather than a purely 
nonviolent struggle — was far more effective 
in mobilizing support among Palestinians, 
winning international sympathy, and splitting 
Israeli public opinion. Arguably, a completely 
nonviolent struggle would have been even 
more effective.23 Instead, in the second 
intifada, from 2000, suicide bombings have 
weakened support for the Palestinian cause.  
 In apartheid South Africa, armed resistance 
was fairly easily crushed by the state. Libera-
tion occurred only after nonviolent action 
became the main mode of struggle.24 Simi-
larly, the East Timorese struggle for independ-
ence achieved success after the armed struggle 
was subordinated to peaceful protest.25 
 The failures of armed struggle are legion. 
Not only do many armed struggles completely 
fail, but in many of those that led to independ-
ence — such as in Vietnam and Algeria — the 
death toll was horrific.26 Furthermore, success-
ful armed struggle is more likely to lead to a 
centralization of power in the subsequent 
government. Armed struggle is especially 
ineffective against systems of representative 
government: there is not a single successful 
                                                                
Durable Democracy (New York: Freedom 
House, 2005). 
23. Souad R. Dajani, Eyes Without Country: 
Searching for a Palestinian Strategy of 
Liberation (Philadelphia: Temple University 
Press, 1994); Andrew Rigby, Living the 
Intifada (London: Zed Books, 1991). 
24. Stephen Zunes, “The Role of Non-violent 
Action in the Downfall of Apartheid,” Journal 
of Modern African Studies, 37 (1999): 137–69. 
25. Chisako M. Fukuda, “Peace through 
Nonviolent Action: The East Timorese 
Resistance Movement’s Strategy for Engage-
ment,” Pacifica Review 12 (February 2000): 
17–31. 
26. Two or three million Vietnamese died in 
the wars for independence and up to a million 
Algerians. 
case of a revolutionary overthrow. This can be 
understood in terms of backfire. Armed strug-
gle has far greater legitimacy when used 
against repressive and corrupt regimes. 
Against a system based on the rule of law and 
majority rule, violent opposition has far less 
legitimacy. Indeed, it can be argued that a 
potent way to reduce non-state terrorism is to 
ensure realistic opportunities exist to work 
through the system (including using nonvio-
lent action) for progressive social change.27 
 Despite nonviolent action’s success record, 
terrorism is still attractive to many for various 
reasons, including those outlined earlier. 
 
Nonviolence against Terrorism 
 
I have argued that nonviolent methods are 
usually far more effective than violent 
methods in promoting beneficial social 
change, because violence commonly leads to 
reduced support and lower legitimacy. There-
fore, one of the ways to reduce terrorism is to 
convince those who are considering violence 
as an option that nonviolent alternatives are 
superior. This line of argument is most 
relevant to reducing non-state terrorism, in 
other words terrorism of the weak.  
 Opposing state terrorism is another matter, 
because states have a vastly greater capacity to 
reduce abhorrence from their own injustices. 
The challenge is to make state terrorism back-
fire by countering each of the five standard 
methods of inhibiting outrage. Countering 
cover-up involves exposing state violence and 
cruelty, for example through whistleblowing, 
investigative reporting, courage of editors, and 
alternative media. Countering devaluation can 
                                         
27. Richard E. Rubenstein, Alchemists of 
Revolution: Terrorism in the Modern World 
(New York: Basic Books, 1987), in a well-
informed assessment of the driving forces 
behind terrorism — especially terrorism asso-
ciated with social revolution and national 
liberation — supports an anti-terrorism policy 
that permits “young intellectuals to be reunited 
through collective action with their people” 
(236). 
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be done through humanizing of targets, for 
example through personal contact, speaking 
tours, and human-interest stories. Countering 
government interpretations — sometimes sin-
cere, sometimes spin and lies — requires 
ongoing efforts to communicate understand-
ings from the point of view of victims and 
critics. Countering the pacifying effect of 
official channels — such as investigations that 
whitewash what is happening — requires 
trusting official procedures less and exposing 
and discrediting processes that give a false 
appearance of justice. Countering intimidation 
and bribery involves refusing to be cowed or 
co-opted and exposing attempts to intimidate 
and bribe.  
 In the 1980s, the U.S. government was 
involved in state terrorism in Central America 
by assisting governments and paramilitary 
groups that imprisoned, assaulted, tortured, 
and killed opponents. The U.S. government 
disguised its role by use of proxy armies — 
notably the Contras in Nicaragua — and client 
governments. It stigmatized opponents as 
communists and terrorists and claimed all its 
actions were in the interests of democracy. 
Opponents in the United States came under 
surveillance and were subject to disruptive 
interventions by government agencies. 
 In opposition to this U.S. state terrorism in 
Central America, many U.S. citizens joined 
peace groups, which together became a power-
ful movement.28 One of the movement’s most 
potent challenges to the government was 
support for refugees from Central America, 
often undertaken through church networks. 
The stories told by these refugees to groups of 
church people avoided government censorship 
and media spin. When church people met 
refugees face to face, the refugees became 
flesh-and-blood humans rather than anony-
mous victims, thereby countering attempts at 
devaluation. The refugees’ stories were a 
direct challenge to the government’s interpre-
tations of its policy. Seeing the way the law 
                                         
28. Christian Smith, Resisting Reagan: The 
U.S. Central America Peace Movement 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996). 
was used against refugees helped to discredit 
formal channels for justice in the eyes of 
movement participants. Finally, the church and 
associated personal networks provided support 
for resisting government intimidation. The 
Central America solidarity movement thus was 
effective in countering each of the five 




Terrorism, as a tool for bringing about a better 
world, has remarkably poor prospects, even 
when the cause being supported is a worthy 
one. Examining the dynamics of outrage from 
injustice leads to the conclusion that nonvio-
lent action is usually far more effective than 
violence in challenging repression and oppres-
sion. In spite of this, violence has a continuing 
appeal to some challengers, for various 
reasons including cultural assumptions, the 
way violence serves to polarize populations 
and cement the role of group leaders, and the 
way violence by non-state groups serves to 
justify state violence.  
State terrorism also has a continuing appeal 
to state elites, because it often achieves its 
immediate ends, though seldom are these 
supportive of values such as peace and 
freedom. Because terrorism so often serves the 
interests of powerholders in state and non-state 
groups — almost always male dominated, 
hierarchical, and secretive — it is unlikely 
violence will be renounced any time soon. 
 Nonviolent action is a continuing challenge 
to violent options, both as an exemplary alter-
native to non-state violence and as a method of 
opposing state violence. Examining the five 
main methods for inhibiting outrage over 
injustice can offer guidance for nonviolent 
campaigns, as shown by the example of the 
Central America peace movement. It is also 
possible to use this same approach to suggest 
ways of highlighting how nonviolence is 
superior to violence. This leads to the follow-
ing five suggestions. 
 
 • Reveal the value of nonviolence by 
further studies of historical and contemporary 
use of nonviolent action. 
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 • Counter devaluation of nonviolence prac-
titioners by emphasizing their courage and 
suffering and their unwillingness to harm 
others. 
 • Counter interpretations of nonviolence as 
passive and ineffective by documenting its 
successes and documenting the failures of 
violence. 
 • Avoid relying on government support for 
promotion of nonviolent alternatives, and 
avoid assuming that government initiatives — 
sanctions, peacekeeping, peace plans, disar-
mament negotiations, treaties, laws — are 
going to solve problems or, indeed, are intrin-
sically nonviolent. 
 • Refuse to be intimidated by critics of 
nonviolence and refuse to be bought off by 
opportunities within the mainstream. 
 
 The backfire framework offers a way of 
analyzing tactics against injustice. In doing so, 
it reveals the shortcomings of terrorism and 
the strengths of nonviolent action. Nonviolent 
action is both an alternative to non-state 
terrorism, a method of challenging the social 
conditions that can breed non-state terrorism, 
and a method of challenging state terrorism. It 
is thus a potent but neglected anti-terrorist 
tool.29 
                                         
29. See, generally, Tom H. Hastings, Nonvio-
lent Response to Terrorism (Jefferson, NC: 
McFarland, 2004). There are other ways that 
nonviolent approaches can be mobilized 
against terrorism. One is to replace large, 
potentially dangerous technological systems, 
such as large power plants, dams, and refiner-
ies, with small-scale decentralized systems, 
such as energy efficiency and renewable 
energy systems, thereby reducing the vulner-
ability of societies to terrorists. See Brian 
Martin, Technology for Nonviolent Struggle 
(London: War Resisters’ International, 2001). 
Another is to replace the present intelligence 
services, based on secrecy and centralized 
control, with agencies that openly publish their 
findings, thereby becoming more accountable 
as well as more reliable. See Brian Martin, 
“Nonviolence Versus Terrorism,” Social 
Alternatives 21 (Autumn 2002): 6–9. 
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